THE STAG HUNT

Two equilibria. One requires trust. One does not.

Player 2
Cooperate Defect
Player 1 Cooperate Stag, Stag 3 , 3 Nothing, Hare 0 , 2
Defect Hare, Nothing 2 , 0 Hare, Hare 2 , 2
Trust Basin
payoff-dominant
Coercion Basin
risk-dominant

Stag pays more only if the partner hunts Stag with probability above 2/3, so under random initial conditions the coercion basin covers two thirds of the state space and the trust basin one third. Communication and repeated play enlarge the trust basin (Skyrms 2004).

Basin geometry: the Trust Attractor is the deeper valley, not the larger basin

The Trust Attractor energy barrier COERCION shallower · wider · the default under random starts TRUST deeper · narrower order parameter φ → free energy V

Both equilibria are stable. The trust basin is deeper:
harder to reach, harder to escape, thermodynamically favored.

core conceptemergent / positiveconstraint / breakdown